Bangladesh and Corruption

Bribery, Lobbying, and an Unaccountable State – Bangladesh

In Bangladesh, a fever comes on before you even step into a government office. The uncertainty — who will you have to bribe, how do you do it, how much will it cost — becomes a citizen’s constant companion. And yet, the very purpose of the state was to serve its citizens.

I live abroad. In the past few years here, I have had to visit a government office only three or four times. Once to get my photo taken for a national ID and driving license, once for a road driving test, and once at the social office — because my name has three parts. “S M Saifur” — in a country built around first name, middle name, and last name, this structure confuses their systems. It took just one trip to fix that. Everything else — bank account, credit card, taxes, insurance — was handled online or over the phone. I even got a credit card from a bank with no branch in this city; the nearest one is 500 kilometres away.

Even when I do have business at a government office here, there is no fear. I know that if I show up at my appointment time, I will receive the service I am entitled to. That is what a functional state looks like.

The Bribery Ecosystem: Where the Abnormal Becomes Normal

At a government office in Bangladesh, there are only two paths — either you need a reference from someone influential, or you pay a bribe. This is not the exception; it has become the rule. I was a victim of it myself at the income tax office.

It is precisely this system that gives birth to “lobbying” and back-channel influence. People know their work will not get done through normal channels. So they need a phone call from someone powerful. If you have the right connections, the bribe might be a little less — that itself passes for consolation. As a result, the primary occupation of ministers and secretaries becomes managing these influence channels. In Bangladesh, this has become a fully-fledged commercial industry.

Two Countries, Two Experiences

Where does the difference lie? Not only in resources, and not merely in attitude — the difference is in the system. In a country where an official’s work is evaluated, the official works. In a country where there is no evaluation, bribery and influence-peddling are the only way forward.

The Logical Framework: Without Measurement, There Is No Improvement

In development work, I spent years working with the Logical Framework Approach (LFA). In this method, a matrix is built for every project — what is the goal, what are the indicators, what are the verification sources, and what assumptions underpin the plan. From this matrix alone, you can tell whether a project has succeeded or failed.

Bangladesh’s government officials face no such evaluation process. A District Commissioner is appointed based on party loyalty. No one asks how much they know about the district, what their plans are, where their creativity lies. And if no one asks, there is no need to find answers.

A Roadmap for Reform: Promotion by Competence

If I were a policymaker, I would introduce two major changes.

The Core Question: Is the Salary Being Earned?

Government letters close with the words “issued in the public interest.” But whether that public interest is actually being served — no one checks. Year after year, unaccountable employment rolls on. Occasionally, a minor punishment is handed out for failing to call a superior “sir” or for breaching protocol — but there is no punishment for failing to deliver services.

In a system where performance is never measured, performance never improves. This is the fundamental problem with public services in Bangladesh. The solution lies in the same place — building a culture of evaluation, establishing a framework of accountability, and ensuring that competence is rewarded.

Citizens will no longer dread stepping into a government office on the day they know — that serving them is the official’s job, it is the duty of the position, and there are consequences for failing to do it.